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Quantitative Easing of an International Financial Centre: 
how central London came so well out of the post-2007 crisis 
 
Three Motivating Snippets 
 
Hat check girl: "Goodness, what beautiful diamonds"; Blonde customer: "Goodness had 
nothing to do with it, dearie”.      Mae West, Night After Night, 1937 
 
'The problem with QE is: it works in practice, but it doesn’t work in theory‘. 
Ben Bernanke, final Q & A as Chair of the Fed, 
2014 
 





Seven years into the current economic depression, consciousness of the extent to which 
London - which jointly fathered the financial crisis (Wojcik, 2013) - escaped lightly from 
its consequences (even if many individual Londoners did not) still seems to be growing, 
though there is not yet an adequate explanation of how it happened.  Rhetorically, the 
terms of discussion polarise between: a view of the city as rising to new challenges of 
change, competition and creativity, and triumphing over its rivals in strictly economic 
terms; and one which sees it as having been unreasonably favoured by those public and 
private sector decision-makers applying the prescribed austerity – again triumphing,  but 
in more political terms.    
Adopting a rather more detached analytic perspective, and focusing on the specific puzzle 
as to why London’s overall employment trends have been so favourable since 2007 
(against the norm elsewhere), there currently seem to be three kinds of potential 
explanation in play.  One of these suggests that, irrespective of institutional responses to 
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the banking crisis and fiscal deficit, the London economy is simply much better placed 
than its rivals to cope with their aftermath, given its long term sources of competitive 
advantage (‘when the going gets tough, the tough get going’ ?) .  A second takes a more 
contingent approach, accounting for the relatively favourable employment trends in 
London in relation to several independent factors which have conditioned the way in 
which post-2007 cut-backs (in jobs, infrastructure investment and/or public services) 
came to be applied in London (with the city ‘punching beyond its weight’ ?).  The last, 
almost ignored so far, posits a more straightforward link with the character of the 
financial crisis, and the massive scale of the support that the state has felt obliged to 
deploy since then, to the great benefit of the big beasts of UK financial services, and 
London as an international finance centre – rather than to other parts of the national 
economy (‘goodness had nothing to do with it’?).    
The distinctive focus of this paper is on exploring the third of these. But it starts by 
examining the character and unexpectedness of employment growth in London since 
autumn 2007, and then discusses the limits to how much of this remarkable development 
the first two types of explanation could account for, alone or together. When they prove 
inadequate to explain how London weathered the aftermath of this crisis so very much 
better than the last one, two decades earlier, attention then turns entirely to the 
significance of the support accorded to the financial sector by the state (and indirectly the 
taxpayer/saver).  It makes  a case firstly in terms of the massive scale of that support, and 
its concentration on London-based operations, and then by seeking to establish credible 
ways in which bail-outs, implicit subsidy and quantitative easing can have been translated 
specifically into employment/spending power within London – and overseas – rather than 
elsewhere within the UK. The conclusion addresses the question of how far recent 
indicators of a vigorous boom in the central London economy (particularly) represented 
the beginnings of another speculative cycle, after one whose bust phase was effectively 
masked, rather than more evidence of transition to a stable and sustainable growth path1. 
 
Differential Employment Impacts of the Financial Crisis 2007-14: Central London 
versus the RUK 
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Over the half century before the financial crisis, employment trends in (Greater) London2 
reflected three main factors: a continuing secular expansion in business services; limits 
on space availability for economic activity or worker housing; and a sharp decline in 
goods-related jobs, where agglomeration economies offered the least advantage.  
In the first half of this period, the scale of manufacturing/port transport job loss 
outweighed that of growth in office employment.  But by the early 1980s there were few 
jobs left to lose in London’s goods-related sectors and the balance switched, yielding 
some net increase in overall employment.  The switch-point coincided with several 
qualitative developments which reinforced these trends:  a resurgence of globalisation, 
involving extended market competition (in services as well as goods); increasing reliance 
in advanced economies on product qualities as the basis for competitive advantage; and 
multinationalisation of business and of financial markets via interlinked international 
financial centres (Buck et al., 2002).  
Around these broad long-term trends the city’s economy experienced fluctuations, which 
were very largely parallel to those across the rest of the UK.  In the first half of the period 
these cyclical swings were proportionately smaller than in any other region, whereas in 
the second half the position was reversed, and they appeared proportionately larger than 
anywhere else3.   
This shift was not simply because of London’s more rapid transition from an industrial to 
a post-industrial economy, but reflected a more general switch in the sectoral and spatial 
patterns of activity across the British economy.  In the earlier period cyclicality4 was 
bound up with the degree to which industries served investment/consumer durables 
markets, where demand was more responsive to the current state of liquidity and of the 
‘animal spirits’, in the national economy.  The cyclical sensitivity of regional 
employment then essentially reflected their industrial mix (Gordon, 1985).  In the later 
period, sectoral volatility seems to have more to do with the propensity to innovate – 
being notably high in ITC and financial/business services5.  The most cyclically sensitive 
regions were again those which specialised in the more sensitive activities, but the 
variability now was much greater than purely compositional effects would account for 
(Gordon, forthcoming). One manifestation of this was a particularly severe reduction in 
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London service employment, during the last national recession, between 1989 and 1993, 
when London lost 11% of employee jobs (a drop of 600 thousand) as compared with 4% 
in the rest of the country.  This was the bust after a particularly strong boom, however. 
And volatility now generally appeared to be a systemic property of innovative regions – 
reflecting an intimate relation between innovation, ‘buzz’ and speculation, of all kinds, 
feeding through to regionally significant ‘animal spirits’ (Gordon, 2011).  
It was quite reasonable to expect then that, when (eventually, in autumn 2007) the 'sub-
prime' crisis signalled another on-coming bust (20 years after Black Monday), London 
would be in for substantially more than its share of national job losses.  This did not 
prove to be the case, however: the city’s employment continued to grow, with only a 
modest hiccup, after the second, ‘Lehman Brothers’, shock (in autumn 2008). Taking 
average employment in 2007 as the benchmark - and using a Labour Force Survey-based 
measure counting all ‘main jobs’, whether employed or self-employed, with part-time 
posts treated as half-jobs - there was actually a net increase in London over the next 6 
years of 277 thousand (8%) as compared with a net reduction of 329 thousand (2%) 
across the rest of the country.  Even more strikingly, virtually all of London’s net 
increase was concentrated in the City of London and 4 adjacent boroughs6, where full-
time equivalent (FTE) numbers increased by 259 thousand (20%).  For these central areas 
this actually represented a substantial acceleration of growth as compared with the 3 
previous years (from 1.9% to 3.4% p.a.), whereas elsewhere in London, as outside, there 
was a downturn (from gains of 0.8% p.a. across all other areas, to net losses of 0.1% 
p.a.)7.  This positive differential was evident every year, except for the boroughs’ single 
year of net job losses (in 2008/9) at a rate close to the national average.  But even then, its 
level of employment dropped only just below that of 2007; before powering ahead, and 
getting in 3 years of really strong growth before employment in the rest of the country 
started to recover, in 2013 - if still with growth rates well below those in central 
London)8. This experience contrasts very strongly with that in the last recession, when it 
took a full decade for the central boroughs to recover their (1988) peak level of 
employment – as well as with the norm for European capitals during this one (Dijkstra et 
al.’ 2015).   
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Using ABI/BRES (employer-based) estimates to look more closely at the spatial pattern 
of change9, a coherent zone of strong employment growth is found across an area 
extending some way beyond the historic (rail-terminus-based) boundaries of Central 
London, with an eastern outpost around Canary Wharf on the Isle of Dogs10. On an FTE 
basis, employee jobs alone grew by 208 thousand (14%) within this Central London Zone 
(CLZ) between 2007 and 2013, against a net decrease of 484 thousand (-2 %) in the rest 
of the UK.  
Despite this remarkable degree of spatial clustering in employment growth, it does not 
appear to be bound up with a single functional cluster of particular economic dynamism. 
Whether this might be the case is not very easy to test, because - though casual 
empiricism suggests all sorts of interdependence among the activities of London’s central 
business district, and interested parties encourage the idea that everything ultimately 
depends on financial services (or even its global sector) – there has been no substantial 
research effort to quantify the strength and structure of these linkages.  However, the fact 
that at a detailed sectoral level CLZ trends look very uneven, with most broad (service) 
sectors including some high growth activities, not obviously linked to those in others, 
suggests that several distinguishable groups have all done very well within the CLZ, for 
one reason or more. 
A rough but plausible grouping of these expanding activities involves half a dozen rather 
different foci, each contributing significantly to overall job growth11: 
1. Finance (including IT within the financial districts) adding some 20 thousand 
jobs; 
2. Business administration (head offices, and management consultancy) up by 
some 50 thousand jobs;  
3. Property Development/Services (construction, architecture and real estate) up 
by around 35-50 thousand12; 
4. Creative Commerce (publishing, broadcasting, film/video and advertising, 
plus some IT in the creative districts) up by some 30 thousand; 
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5. Public Services (administration, health, education and social care) up by some 
50 thousand; 
6. Tourism (hotels and restaurants) up about 20 thousand. 
Though wide-ranging, this listing of expanding activity-clusters actually excludes many 
core central London services (e.g. law, accounting, theatres, and retailing).  
Information/digital technology activities, which did show substantial employment 
growth, are not separated out since they seem to play distinct (support) roles in several 
clusters (including finance, creative commerce and business administration), to which 
their job increases were imputed on the basis of the localities in which they occurred.  For 
each of the six clusters which are distinguished, employment trends in the CLZ were 
much more positive than in the rest of the country.  But the relative scale of change 
recorded for particular clusters also clearly reflects some national realities; for instance 
the fact that construction, banking, and publishing experienced job losses across the most 
of the country, while head offices/consultancy showed strong general growth.   
Faster growth of each of these clusters within the Central London Zone, relative to their 
performance elsewhere, made an important contribution to a large (and accelerated) job 
growth in the CLZ during post-crisis years This  is not reducible either to the growth of a 
single cluster or to a generalised upturn in competitiveness of the city's service economy.  
 
 Conventional Explanations of London’s Positive Employment Trends 
 
 London’s Structural Advantages 
One strand of commentary on (Central) London’s success in sustaining and then 
expanding employment levels during the post-crisis period simply draws attention to all 
those sources of structural advantage (or absence of key disadvantages) which have 
generally favoured its economic progress, over that of other UK regions, during the past 
30 years or so.  A short list of these includes: sheer scale; a particularly strong base in  the 
advanced business services which have prospered everywhere during this era; the 
absence (or earlier demise) of the production sectors which have been in long term 
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decline across the UK; a strong capacity to attract, retain and develop a highly qualified 
workforce; a very flexible labour market; a large and sophisticated customer base for 
high value products; and particularly strong international linkages and information 
networks (Buck et al., 2002).  
 
To apply these as explanations for trends since 2007 - and why these differ from previous 
crisis/recovery sequences with less favourable employment outcomes – requires some 
reason for expecting either that some of these advantages have become substantially 
stronger since those earlier episodes, or that the particular way in which the wider 
economy has subsequently evolved would now make some of them much more salient.   
 
One obvious structural advantage has been in the industrial mix of (Central) London jobs, 
with a very few in the manufacturing sector, where employment elsewhere fell by some 
20% (600 thousand jobs), and substantially more in business services where it actually 
grew by half that amount. This compositional difference alone could account for 6 out of 
the 22 percentage points difference in proportionate employment change between the 5 
central boroughs and the rest of the UK.  The significance of this factor is not peculiar to 
this post-crisis period, however, being central to longer term trends in the area since 
conventional manufacturing disappeared from central London.  To see what it might 
explain in relation to this particular downturn, we need firstly to express (annual) rates of 
employment change for each sector in terms of deviations from the longer term (peak-
peak) rates of change – and then compare the latest downturn with its predecessor in the 
early 1990s13. On this basis, sectoral variations in the impact of the downturns look more 
modest.  For the 1990s case, the sharpest decreases nationally were experienced in 
production industries.   After the 2007 crisis, however, it was construction which had the 
severest job losses, followed by a wide range of commercial services (including in which 
those central London specialises in), though with professional/technical services showing 
little impact, and public services actually expanding their employment14. In neither case 
then does it seem that London’s particular responsiveness (in the 1990s) or 
unresponsiveness (post-2007) can be attributed to its pattern of sectoral specialisation.  
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In occupational terms also it might be thought that (Central) London would have been 
substantially favoured by its bias toward jobs demanding higher levels of qualification - 
given that employers are (rationally) expected to respond to temporary downturns in 
demand by hanging on to, or ‘hoarding’ those workers who would be most expensive to 
replace and reintegrate when the upturn comes, while releasing redundant workers in less 
skilled jobs.  This rule of thumb may not fit the post-2007 situation, however, for a 
couple of reasons. The first is that, once the scale of the financial shock became evident 
(after a year or so of ‘phoney crisis’ for most sectors) few can have expected a rapid 
recovery in demand.  The other is that the principle has less force in a thick labour market 
such as London’s where there are many employers of any particular skill type, and 
workers are less likely to drift away during a downturn (Buck/Gordon, 2000)15.  As it 
turned out, while different skill groups were unevenly affected by employers’ responses 
to falling demand, in this occasion it did not simply favour those in jobs with more 
qualified workers, or those traditionally concentrated in central London.   Thus, while 
across the country as a whole it was professional jobs (the most over-represented group in 
the CLZ) which grew fastest between 2007 and 2013, they were nearly matched by 
caring, leisure and service occupations  (of which the CLZ has relatively less); at the 
other extreme, the two groups showing the fastest contractions were process/machine 
operatives and secretarial/administrative workers – one being much under-represented in 
central London, while it has an above average proportion of the latter.  It is a very mixed 
picture, which arithmetically suggests just a slight occupational bias in central London’s 
favour (of about 2%) over this period – maybe no more than in pre-crisis years. 
 
A more original hypothesis has linked London’s performance after this crisis to the 
emergence of more entrepreneurial combinations of the (artistically) creative, and IT 
talent that the city attracts. The most publicised versions associate this with an emergent 
‘Tech City’, in regenerated areas of inner east London, with some recent government 
support. These accounts tend, however, to conflate: a qualitative image, based on 
(artistically) creative businesses in the Shoreditch and Clerkenwell areas (just north of the 
City), that emerged during the dot-com bubble; a much larger-scale (post-2007) growth 
of IT businesses in core financial districts (of the City itself and Canary Wharf); and 
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potential development space further east around the Olympic Park (Whitehead et al., 
2012; McWilliams, 2015).  In fact, though the recovery has seen a substantial growth of 
jobs in creative commerce (specifically advertising and video production), this has been 
largely in established West End and Holborn concentrations, rather than the inner east.  In 
relation to the more novel developments of creative tech, and the contribution to these of 
official ‘Tech City’ initiatives, whatever their longer term prospects, the available 
research (Nathan and Vandore, 2014) suggests that they cannot yet be credited with a 
substantial role in the CLZ’s post-2007 employment boom.    
 
A much clearer boost has come from (central) London’s established strength as a 
destination for international tourists, with approaching half of their UK expenditure 
(D/OE, 2012), and growth that actually accelerated after the crisis. Demand in this sector 
is income elastic (and thus sensitive to recession elsewhere) but also price elastic16 and 
thus one of the significant winners from the large sterling depreciation (of around 25%) 
occurring alongside the share price collapse between mid-2007 and early 2009.  The 
outcome across London as a whole was that spending by these visitors fell back by under 
3% in the first 2 years of the crisis, and then resumed the rapid growth path of the boom 
years (averaging 9% p.a. since 2009). Rough arithmetic on elasticity estimates and 
employment figures for the sector suggests that sterling depreciation may well have 
contributed 20 thousand FTEs to job growth in the CLZ.  
 
Another of London’s established strengths which might have contributed to growth over 
the period stems from a specialisation in highly differentiated elite consumption 
opportunities with a ‘global city’ cachet.  A historic competitive advantage in serving this 
market has been reinforced over the past 30 years as increased income inequalities within 
the UK have boosted the spending power of the top tail of the city’s (increasingly) 
skewed occupational structure (Buck et al., 2002).  This trend may have been reinforced 
in one or two important ways since the financial crises.   
 
One is an apparent upsurge in the fraction of a newly wealthy ‘global’ elite with offshore 
incomes who choose to base themselves for at least part of their time in London.  There is 
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a long run dynamic to their growth, from enjoyment of the social/consumption 
externalities of living among their peers17. Stories abound about a distinct influx since 
2007 of rich migrants seeking a more secure home for their assets. But hard facts about 
numbers and economic impacts (beyond those on property prices in the most desirable 
locations) are elusive.  
 
The other, combines the propositions of Kapur et al (2005, 2006a/b) about the high 
consumption propensities among a growing superclass of (high-earning and asset-rich 
plutocrats, with a common perception that they alone may have prospered from the crisis 
and its aftermath. Well documented reports of CEOs’ soaring salaries/reward packages 
during this period lend credibility to the hypothesis.  But, over the span of the whole 6 
year (crisis, recession and recovery) period considered in this paper, the evidence is that 
neither earnings nor wealth levels have grown especially fast among those in the 
plutocratic class (say the top 1% or 0.1%).  Reversing the pattern of pre-crisis trends, 
evidence from tax returns actually suggests no overall income growth at all the 99th 
percentile in the UK (up to 2012/3), while increasing significantly at lower levels 
(HMRC, 2015). Among the top 0.1% too, runaway growth in current incomes, before the 
crisis, was reversed after 2009 (Alvaredo et al., 2015). In relation to wealth, while the 
share of the top 1% does seem to have increased by a further couple of percentage points 
since the crisis, total personal wealth in the UK, which is estimated to have grown by 
about 50% in the years before, quickly fell back again; though recovering from 2011 on, 
it only regained its 2007 level in 2013 (CSR, 2014). For the 2007-13 period as a whole 
then, the implication is that wealth levels of the super-rich had growth quite modestly (by 
about 10%), though rising strongly during the recovery phase.  Given the particular 
importance of financial (rather than property) assets to the plutocracy, the FTSE index 
provides another (simpler) indicator of likely trends in their wealth: in real (price 
adjusted) terms, this fell by about 40% in 2008/9, undoing the gains of the previous 4 
years, but then quickly turned up again, recovering about half the lost ground by 2013.  
Similar trends in the purchasing power of the globally mobile elite are reflected in an 
index of London prices for prime international residential properties which, having fallen 
by about 25% in 2008/9, then turned around and advanced steadily to a point some 50% 
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higher by 2013 (KF, 2014). In summary, then, it seems that the plutonomy factor can 
scarcely explain London’s unexpectedly strong performance over the period as a whole; 
but that it might have contributed substantially to the strength of the economic upturn in 
the second half of the period.  
 
 
Spatially Significant Policies (public and private) 
Another line of explanation involves the idea that the central London economy may have 
been particularly favoured during the post-crisis period by central government initiatives 
or strategic shifts on the part of corporate decision-makers with London-centric views. 
Potentially significant examples among these include both major infrastructure projects 
of the Olympic Games and Crossrail, and apparently quite uneven effects in the 
application of rationalisation/austerity programmes in the private and public sectors, as 
between (central) London and other parts of the country.   
 
The London Olympic bid (in 2004) and award (in 2005) both date from the heyday of the 
long boom, and even the quadrupling of its budget (to £9.2bn, in March 2007) pre-dated 
recognition of any emergent crisis.   Crossrail as a project had a very much longer history 
(including a government supported bill in 1991) and had been approved in principle on 
several occasions (though without assured funding), before the 2010 spending review 
finally spelled out how the £15 bn. costs would be met, including a £5bn. contribution 
from central government.  Investment in both projects is spread over a number of years: 
including 5 years of concentrated activity in the case of the Olympics and some 9 years 
for Crossrail.   Most of the public sector activity for both18 is included within the capital 
account of the Treasury’s Public Spending Statistics under the Economic Affairs 
heading19. For London as a whole, this shows a growth from £2.4 bn. in 2007-8 to a peak 
of £4.2 bn. in 2009-10, before settling back to £3 bn. in 2012-13 – while the total in other 
regions fell from £23 bn. to £12 bn. and then £10 bn.  Given the timing of the Olympics, 
and the fact that the main site lay mostly outside the central boroughs (and wholly outside 
the CLZ) it is just Crossrail that is likely to be of significance in relation to central 
London employment growth between 2007 and 2013. Its construction workforce has been 
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around 10 thousand, with the great majority probably employed within the central 
boroughs, where both tunnelling and new stations are concentrated, contributing maybe a 
quarter of the 35 thousand growth in construction jobs recorded there between 2010 and 
201320.  
 
In addition to these impacts of discrete investment projects, there are ‘policy’ issues also 
about the spatial structuring of retrenchment in both public and private sector activities in 
the face of revenue and fiscal shocks. These questions arise particularly, since both 
private headquarters and public services appear as activity clusters with expanding 
employment recorded in central London. 
Within the public service sector21, some of the recorded employment increases (e.g. in 
primary schools or social care services), funded on a more-or-less formulaic basis are 
likely to reflect particular sources of local demand growth, as with the growing school 
age population in areas of recent immigration.  Others (including universities and 
hospitals) where there is more active competition for students, programmes and advanced 
facilities, may reflect the changing terms on which this is carried out (e.g. with full-cost 
fees applied to all students) offering a greater potential for big city institutions with 
strong national/international reputations to prosper. 
But there is also a generic issue, straddling the public and private sectors about how head 
offices and other strategic functions have fared in the face of general rationalisation 
pressures.  A common theme here seems to have been a strengthening of these core 
operations, while cost saving has been pursued elsewhere. In the private sector, head 
offices were newly recognised as an ‘industry’, in the 2007 version of the SIC, which had 
previously just distinguished the HQs of multi-sectoral conglomerates. Since a first 
appearance in the 2008 ABI/BRES, the head office category has continuously expanded, 
adding some 120 thousand jobs nationally (+92%) over the next 5 years, including 25 
thousand in the CLZ (+155%)22.  A parallel process seems to have operated within the 
mainstream bank/building society sector, whereby boards have sought to make good the 
losses (and legal penalties) incurred in their ‘wholesale’ investment banking operations 
by cost-cutting initiatives focused on retail banking and its back-office supports out in the 
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regions. Between 2008 and 2013, while (on ABI/BRES figures) the sector’s employment 
in the central boroughs grew by some 14 thousand (14%), across the rest of the country it 
fell by 40 thousand (11%).  Within the civil service too, job reductions over this period 
were much more modest in central London, because the one significant group to have 
increased their numbers (by 10%) were the policy-grade officials (1-7) in Whitehall, 
directly supporting ministers.  Across the sectors then, the chosen forms of structural 
adjustment since the crisis - reinforcing strategic functions while rationalising jobs in 
routine production, support and client-facing activities - have indirectly afforded a 
significant boost to Central London’s share of national employment.  
 
Summary: how much can these explain? 
To try to sum up this section’s survey of more-or-less conventional explanations of 
Central London’s strong employment performance since 2007, there are really three 
aspects that need to be explained:  
 why employment grew there when it did not in other parts of the country; 
 how it managed to grow more rapidly in the years after 2007 than in the 
boom years before; and 
 why during the recession years it also managed to put on a substantial 
number of jobs whereas in the early 1990s recession, which had some 
similar features, it had very large job losses. 
In relation to the first question, our review of 8-10 potential explanations suggested that 
broad pattern of sectoral specialisation as the clearest positive factor, backed up by its 
particular niche in a growing head office sub-sector, Crossrail construction work, 
devaluation-assisted tourist growth, more resilient or favoured public services, and a 
slightly favourable occupational mix.  Some of these are hard to quantify, but together it 
seems that they might possibly account for 15 percentage points out of the 22 point gap 
between Central London and Rest of UK employment growth between 2007 and 2013.      
 
Turning to the second question, the issue is harder, because central London’s 
sectoral/occupational specialisation assets would have been at least as relevant during the 
era of sustained growth before the crisis, as after it.  What is left as potentially significant 
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contributors to improved performance after 2007 then seems to be: Crossrail: the new 
head office boom: and enhanced price competitiveness for international tourism.  These 
would, however, have to be set against some (rather strong) counterfactual expectation of 
crisis/recession induced contraction across a wide range of marketed services – and seem 
quite inadequate to outweigh those and deliver the observed overall acceleration of 
employment growth trends. 
 
The third question, involving comparison with the early 1990s recession (when the 5 
central boroughs lost 136 thousand jobs, faring as badly as the rest of London, and much 
worse than areas outside), picks up on what seems the most obvious such counterfactual. 
In absolute terms, the fact that such large job losses were not repeated after 2007 must 
partly reflect the fact that output contraction across the whole country was accommodated 
rather more this time by reduced productivity/earnings than massive redundancies. But, if 
we focus on the relationship with national trends, the shift between the two recessions 
from much worse to much better outcomes in central London can be accounted for only 
very partially by any of the ‘conventional’ factors considered in this section, specifically 
it seems by a combination of Crossrail, increased concentration on head offices, and the 
devaluation boost to international tourism. For the bulk of the explanation if this crucial 
shift we have to look elsewhere, and consider what bank support policies can have 
contributed.           
 
Support for the UK Finance Sector since the Financial Crisis 
 
Since the onset of the crisis, with the recognition in autumn 2007 of sub-prime lending 
(in the US and on a more limited scale in the UK), UK financial services and their major 
stakeholders have benefited from three distinguishable types of support from (or through) 
the state: 
1 bail-outs, designed to safeguard key elements of the banking system (nationally, 
but also internationally), through a combination of direct investment in vulnerable 
banks and state initiated restructuring; 
 15 
2 implicit subsidies to banking operations during potentially risky times, as an 
unintended consequence of the market’s understanding that similar safeguards 
were to expected in any future situations where large/strategically significant 
banks were at risk; and 
3 monetary expansion, via Bank rate23 reductions and injections of additional 
liquidity – including rounds of quantitative easing (QE) and a Funding for 
Lending scheme – to revive both demand and supply of investment finance, in 
support of a desired recovery and rebalancing of the UK economy.  
 
Bailouts 
Financial bail-out operations in the UK started with efforts in 2007/8 to stem a run on the 
Northern Rock mortgage bank, and then to deal with the impact on other banks’ balance 
sheets of mortgage-backed securities and other assets that had become illiquid following 
the sub-prime crisis. For Northern Rock this involved first a special loan facility from the 
Bank of England, and then nationalisation, with a subsequent sell-off of the more viable 
banking operations.  For the much wider set of banks facing consequential balance sheet 
problems, a Special Liquidity Scheme was introduced.  This was intended simply to 
resolve these, not to finance any new lending.  But it effectively provided subsidised 
capital to a large number of banks with such problematic assets. At the Scheme’s peak in 
early 2009, £185bn of Treasury bills had been lent by the Bank for a period of up to three 
years (John et al., 2012).   
A much broader UK bank rescue package followed in the (autumn 2008) second stage of 
the crisis, as the failure of Lehman Bros. in New York set off an international wave of 
concern about bank stability.  This package included both a state guarantee for inter-bank 
lending and provision for the government to buy bank shares, subject to some policy 
conditions (on executive pay, dividends and lending policy).  This provision was 
extended over the following year to cover rescue of two of the UK’s largest banks 
(Lloyds and RBS) and another building society (the Bradford and Bingley).  The total 
value of guarantees then rose to a peak of over £1 trn., with an actual cash commitment 
 16 
of around £120 bn.24. Expressed aims included encouragement of lending to creditworthy 
borrowers, but the dominant concerns were clearly protecting depositors and maintaining 
financial stability, by assuring the liquidity and capital of the banks.  
 
Implicit Subsidies 
The second line of support to the (big) banks was unintended, but followed from the bail-
out experience, taking the form of implicit subsidies, as a perceived government 
guarantee of their viability allowed the banks to borrow at lower interest rates. Even 
before the 2007/8 financial crisis, there had been some such subsidy (as now at the 
expense of savers, rather than tax-payers). But their value grew sharply during these 
crises, as the objective riskiness of the banks’ position was understood, and then 
(decisively) as bailouts made clear the political reality that these banks were ‘too big’ (or 
strategically significant) to be allowed ‘to fail’.  Increased margins of implicit subsidy 
still persist internationally despite various states signalling an intended shift toward ‘bail 
ins’ (by creditors) in any similar situations (Elliott, 2014).      
In the UK, recognition of the importance of these subsidies dates from Haldane’s (2010) 
analyses, showing how gaps in rating agencies’ evaluation of major banks’ 
creditworthiness, according to assumptions about state support, translated into differences 
in the borrowing costs they incurred.   For the ‘big 5’ UK banks these were estimated at 
£59bn. in 2008, and £107 bn. in 2009:  with a comparable methodology, IMF (2014) 
shows the rate of subsidy falling off in each subsequent year, though still well above pre-
crisis levels in 2013; with an alternative methodology, they have the interest rate subsidy 
to ‘systematically important banks’ rising again in 2012/3 to well above its 2009 peak.  
Unintended (and undesirable) effects of these subsidies included both incentivising 
excessive risk-taking (moral hazard), and encouraging individual banks to expand well 
beyond the point of maximum (social) productivity.  Perversely, both risks of failure and 
the unacceptability of such events were thus enhanced.  And, ironically, restructuring of 
those UK banks that actually needed bailing out during the crisis served to further 
increase concentration (Haldane, 2012).     
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Monetary expansion 
By contrast with these forms of support to the (UK) banking system itself, monetary 
interventions - to reduce the general cost of borrowing, increase liquidity and/or expand 
the money supply - were directed more at boosting levels of activity in the productive 
economy.   Whether, how, and where this is effectively achieved are not clear-cut, 
however, either in theory or in terms of empirical econometrics. This is the force of 
Bernanke’s parting quote about the major intervention of this kind working ‘in practice, 
but not in theory’. 
 
Three forms of monetary intervention of this kind have been pursued sequentially in the 
UK since the 2007/8 crises.  Initially it involved conventional form of bank rate cuts, 
intended to revive investment and bring forward discretionary spending by reducing the 
cost of credit (and encourage optimism). The scale of the shock to expectations from the 
crisis events, plus a ‘credit crunch’ as lenders sought to tighten up on what now appeared 
much riskier loans, meant that a rapid series of such bank rate reductions had to be made 
– with the rate falling to an effective ’floor’ of 0.5% in March 2009.   
To provide further monetary stimulus to a very weak economy, the Bank of England then 
followed the example of its US counterpart, introducing the more experimental 
(‘unconventional’) programme of asset purchases characterised as quantitative easing 
(QE).  In essence this involved the Bank printing (electronic) money to finance purchase 
of gilts and other high quality financial assets from private businesses.   Quite how this 
monetary intervention would connect with developments in the real economy was always 
going to be both complex and uncertain, with theoretical expectations depending on how 
imperfect the capital market was in practice (Weale and Wieladek, 2015).  One of the 
central ideas was that injecting  liquidity in this way, lowering of the yield on less risky 
asset types, should encourage a flow of funds into the corporate sector, and (crucially) 
into productive investment (‘portfolio rebalancing’) – preferably within the UK, though 
that aspect was not spelled out.  The other idea was that potential borrowers with a 
prospect of redeeming a debt, but concern over its cost, should understand the Bank as 
‘signalling’ an intent to keep the interest rate low beyond the short term.  Some (more 
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uncertain) investors might, of course, also get the message that the Bank did not foresee a 
strong upturn in demand across the UK economy in the near future.   The initial budget 
for asset purchases was set at £165 bn., with subsequent rounds in 2011-12 bringing the 
total to £375 bn..  Though the magnitudes are comparable to those estimated for implicit 
subsidies, it should be emphasised that they are not comparable as forms of support to the 
financial sector, which benefits from QE only to degree that it can use this to achieve 
increased returns (or, equivalently, to sustain returns while meeting tighter liquidity 
targets).  
Though the Bank referred to QE as ‘injecting money directly into the economy’ (BOE, 
2009), it was not at all closely targeted, and the Bank’s statements were not explicit as to 
whether ‘the economy’ in question was purely national.  The evidence is that it scarcely 
affected domestic money supply, while bank lending actually fell (Koo, 2015, 10)25. To 
encourage a more direct flow of funds from banks into the (UK) real economy and get 
investment moving, a Funding for Lending Scheme was then introduced (jointly with the 
Treasury) in mid-2012 - modified in the 2 subsequent years and now running into 2016, 
with incentives related to their lending performance (rewarding SME funding of all 
kinds, and then just business lending in later versions). The total drawdown on this 
scheme at the end of  2015 had reached £69bn., but net lending by the banks only became 
(marginally) positive during that year. 
 
The Spatial Ramifications of Financial Support Policies 
Since the 2007-8 financial crises the explicit aims of UK economic policies have 
involved firstly dealing with the threat/actuality of a recession in the national economy, 
and secondly initiating some longer-term rebalancing of the economy, in structural terms, 
but also regionally (reducing dependence on the extended London region).  Under the 
Labour government, sustaining public sector demand was used as a means of supporting 
activity levels, but since 2010 that has depended essentially on monetary policies, which 
have continued to be essentially macroeconomic in their aims and analytic basis.  The 
Bank of England’s own operational goal is set in terms of securing a level of demand in 
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that economy consistent with a medium term inflation rate of around 2%.  And (with the 
recent exception of a more targeted Financial Loan Scheme) support policies have been 
aimed essentially at: securing the bank deposits, and the core set of financial institutions 
on which the mass of British businesses and citizens depend; and enabling/encouraging 
financial institutions to resume investing in longer-term/risky business opportunities.  
These priorities (and policy tools) left little scope for thinking about the regional 
dimension of responses and impacts within the UK – though that might be relevant to 
consideration of complementary policies. More surprisingly, however, potential 
international implications also seem to have been considered in only a restricted way - in 
relation to exchange rate impacts, and encouraging complementary action by other major 
nations. That too is understandable for conventional interest rate-based policies, which 
operate essentially within/across the (national) currency area.  But it seems much less so 
for the unconventional policy of QE with its less transparent ramifications, in the context 
of a globalised set of financial markets (of which London is a key hub).     
From an economic geographer’s perspective there are a set of obvious questions to be 
asked – crudely about ‘where the money goes’, in terms of impacts on income streams, 
activity levels, and employment in different locations. Starting to address these (except in 
the case of identifiable bailouts) is very difficult, however, because the monetary/ 
financial analyses are not framed in terms that relate at all closely to components of GDP, 
still less to the sectors and locations where marginal investment projects (or increments to 
demand) might occur. Even addressing the broadest questions about how QE, for 
example, has affected aggregate GDP and the inflation rate has required econometricians 
to make use of high frequency (financial data), and sophisticated monetary  models - 
neither with counterparts at sub-national scales - and omission of the kind of interaction 
effects that would be crucial to spatial analyses.  
There is no realistic prospect (in the near future at least) of moving on to more spatially 
/sectorally disaggregated questions about, for example, how the central London economy 
has been impacted – and with what implications for the rest of the UK.  But the scale of 
the monetary interventions pursued during this period is so vast that even identification of 
any credibly significant source of uneven impacts would be worthwhile. As a starting 
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point here, some simple arguments and observations are offered in relation to bailouts, 
implicit subsides and QE, relevant to how (central) London might have been 
differentially affected.   
In the case of bailouts, the very obvious geographic point is that 3 of the 4 banks 
requiring direct state support were actually headquartered in peripheral regions (in 
Yorkshire, the North East and in Edinburgh), where the largest numbers of jobs, and 
probably accounts too, would have been at risk – though the feared knock-on effects 
would have accrued throughout the country and presumably impacted on London as the 
national banking centre.     
For the implicit subsidies accruing to the big banks, the situation is a bit different, in that 
while we have reasonable estimates of their net value to different sorts of bank (e.g. in 
IMF, 2014), we don’t know what they do with the money.  Basically it represents a 
simple/unwonted bonus to their profit and loss account (and ‘value added’), in relation to 
wholesale/investment banking activities. And ultimately it is expected to accrue to senior 
employees and shareholders, but its value beyond that of a simple transfer depends on 
what profit-earning investment opportunities the banks apply it to (Sowerbutts and 
Zimmerman, 2015). And what consequences there are for employment levels in the 
sector (and/or its supply chain in IT etc.) depends on how they pursue these.  But, bearing 
in mind that about half of value-added in this sector is absorbed by the salary bill, the 
potential scale of employment effects within the central boroughs, where investment 
banking is concentrated, is indicated by the fact that the average of the banks’ implicit 
subsidy in the two peak years was in excess of the total salary bill for these five boroughs 
(of some £67bn in 200926).  
 
The case of quantitative easing is a lot more complex. In so far as it actually goes 
(ultimately) to fund additional investment projects within the UK, we might suppose that 
the corporate and spatial distribution of the extra activity/employment primarily reflected 
commercial judgements about the expected risk-return relation of these projects. These 
might be located anywhere, presumably more often in established  growth areas than in 
problem regions – but not to be heavily concentrated in central London. But a couple of 
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other scenarios could involve impacts accruing more heavily to this metropolitan core. 
One is if it turns out that a large proportion of the funded investment projects are actually 
offshore, yielding impacts within the UK that are limited to the transaction costs of 
securing the investment opportunity. The other is if, a large part of the actual impact on 
activity levels came, not from such additional projects, but from the induced effects on 
asset values serving to revive the boom in plutocratic spending that was cut off by the 
stock market slump of 2007/8 (‘raising all luxury yachts’).  
 
The first of these hinges around the issue of the potential scale of leakages from QE 
within the UK to investment overseas, notably in emerging market economies (EMEs). 
This possibility seems to have been ignored in the early (spatially blind) discussion of QE 
in both the US and the UK, and then overshadowed by econometric evidence showing 
that QE had significantly boosted the level of domestic GDP (by perhaps 2% in the UK, 
see e.g. BoE, 2012). Arguably that (real) gain is on the modest side, given the degree to 
which the economy had fallen beneath its growth path27.  But, so far there seems to be no 
available benchmark as to what might reasonably be expected from this unconventional 
policy instrument if it were operating in a leak-proof setting.  Anyhow, questions started 
to be raised about the diversion of effects overseas in 2010, by a Texan Federal Bank 
Governor (in the US)  - citing firms as saying that more attractive opportunities to deploy 
cheap money were to be found overseas28 - and by two outsiders presenting  evidence to 
the (UK) Treasury Select Committee  in 201229. The argument was only seriously taken 
up, however, in mid-2013, when analysts and policy-makers with stakes in these 
emerging markets started to express alarm about the impact on inward investment of a 
prospective tapering in the American QE programme.  
 
For the UK case, one simple indicator of the scale of investment into these economies 
since around the time when QE was launched is the large increase in UK balance sheet 
assets there.  Across 29 such emerging economies outside the Eurozone value of these 
assets increased from £384 bn. to £645bn. between 2009 and 2013, with their share of all 
UK-owned international assets rising from 4.4% to 6.7% (compared with a stable figure 
of around 4.8% in the 4 years before the crisis). Others have pointed to the similarity in 
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scale between the credit generated by American QE in particular and the flood of dollar-
denominated loans/bond purchases into the EMEs (with some leverage) over this period 
(Wheatley and Kynge, 2015). These reports have been followed up by f econometric 
studies looking for direct evidence of causal links. Most obtain results implying a 
substantial overspill from QE into these markets (e.g. Chen et al., 2012; Tillmann, 2014; 
and Rafiq, 2015) - though Ahmed and Slate (2013) find it significant only for portfolio 
investment, while Weale and Wieladek (2015) detect no direct impact on emerging 
markets’ production, and Fratscher et al., 2013 report the first two phases of QE in the 
US as having inconsistent effects on the balance of flows.  
 
Bank of England officials do now seem to accept that - because it operates directly on 
asset markets - QE has a much greater potential than conventional monetary policy to 
generate sizable international spillovers, including into emerging market economies 
(BoE, 2015, 8; Haldane, 2015, 1030).  This is quite some way short of saying that a major 
proportion of the additional credit has leaked out in this way but, alongside minimally 
changed levels of domestic money supply and bank lending to firms, that seems pretty 
likely.  A consequential point which has not so far been picked up is that such large scale 
leakages out of the country can have substantial implications for the geographic 
distribution of QE impacts within the country – if these ‘spillovers’ actually entail 
substantial and sophisticated transactional activity. That seems particularly likely if (as 
Wheatley/Kynge and their informants suggest) the translation of gilt sales by businesses 
into e.g. purchases of money-market instruments in an emerging market currency by 
investment funds which leveraged in additional finance. Such transactional and support 
activity, representing the effective basis for GDP impacts within the UK, would have a 
high likelihood of involving central London-based firms. Hence, I hypothesis, QE with a 
high rate of leakage out of the UK into economies with higher rates of return/interest and 
a greater appetite for investment capital (though greater risks also), would be likely to 
have a great part of its residual domestic impact in/around the international financial 
centre.  We do not, however, yet have evidence of how much transactional activity is 
actually generated, or where.  
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In relation to the second scenario, there is a clearer consensus about one of its key 
premises, namely that QE will have particularly boosted the financial position of the 
richest groups.  As expected, official purchase of gilts led to a substantial upturn in the 
value of a wide range of financial assets, disproportionately held by more wealthy 
households – which was expected (in turn) to stimulate higher consumption from asset-
rich households. Overall the Bank of England (2012) estimated that QE was likely to 
have added some £600 billion to total household wealth, with disproportionate gains to 
the 5% who owned 40% of these assets – though that figure understates the likely 
concentration of gains, since it includes widespread holdings in the form of bank deposits 
whose value has not gone up.  For the US, where capital gains data are available, Saez 
(2015) presents a much stronger picture of the concentration of gains from the steep 
revival in share prices, claiming that almost 60% of the total increase in personal incomes 
in the US (including such gains) during the 2009-14 upswing accrued to the top 1%.  The 
intersection of these trends with the consumption side of the plutonomy thesis is picked 
up by Kapur et al (2014) who graphically show the strong relations between the US Fed’s 
total assets (as an indicator of QE) and not just steeply rising NASDAQ/biotech stock 
prices, but also those of a basket of luxury suppliers (growing 6-fold over this period as 
an indication of strongly revived elite consumption) - and with growth in London 
property prices31. What remains is to show that a (QE-fuelled) upsurge in spending by the 
super-rich during the recovery phase has fed into a particular boost to central London 





A central theme of this paper has been the idea that the modern (post-1980s) London 
economy is a fundamentally speculative one – in productive, unproductive and cognitive 
terms – with the implication that it is subject to wider cyclical swings.  That might well 
be true of all dynamic agglomerations, which would help explain why it was the norm for 
European metro capitals to experience larger employment falls than other regions 
following the 2007/8 financial crises (Dijkstra et al., 2015).  In the London case, at least, 
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this tendency toward volatility had suggested that the downturn would be steeper than 
elsewhere in the UK, though when recovery came it should also be stronger in London – 
so long as the credibility of central London’s core business sectors had not suffered too 
much from their involvement in those crises. In fact, however, the evidence of 
employment trends shows that central London (specifically) was no worse affected by the 
downturn than other parts of the country (probably less) – though its recovery has 
certainly been earlier and stronger. In these terms then, over the whole period from 2007 
to 2013, this core area has not only out-performed the rest of the country, but also its own 
pre-crisis trends. 
 
One positive interpretation of this outcome is that it simply reflects an increased 
competitive advantage for the central London economy.  The grounds for believing this 
to have so improved since the (somewhat similar) recession of the early 1990s are not at 
all clear, however, though the impact of an (effective) devaluation on an already strong 
tourist demand would have contributed to this.  
 
If ‘goodness’ is not the whole (or the major) part of the story, then attention turns to ways 
in which significant developments in either public policy or that of the corporate sector 
could have made an important difference. In relation to fiscal policies, though the 
Olympics came and went during this period, the one really substantial factor could have 
been proceeding with the major Crossrail project, adding both materially to construction 
activity and symbolically (along with a rash of foreign-financed high rise developments) 
to confidence in the city’s continuing growth. But additionally, the pattern of growth in 
head offices alongside cost-cutting in branch establishments, and the particular resilience 
of central London’s health/education activities, implies strategic shifts with significant 
positive impacts on this core area of the metropolis. Taken together, however, they go 
hardly anywhere toward explaining why national recession had so little impact in London 
– still less why the scale of its preceding boom was not matched by that of its bust (as in 
the mid-1980s/90s cycle).   
 
The ‘elephant in the room’, ignored in conventional accounts of London’s current 
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economic health is monetary policy.  The analogy is apposite in relation both to the 
vastness of resources being deployed almost invisibly, and in relation to (the ‘blind 
men’s’) puzzlement, as to quite what its ‘unconventional’ elements actually mean for 
processes in the ‘real economy’ - including those in/around the central London financial 
institutions which are in its front line. But, if not simply passed over to shareholders or 
rent-earning senior employees, large subsidies to the investing arms of banks must, add 
substantial employment to their home bases.  And similarly, large injections of liquidity 
which go into high risk opportunities abroad should be expected to have their main UK 
impacts in the places that handle/enable these transactions – and can satisfy the 
sophisticated tastes of their stakeholders.  
 
Central London’s relatively strong employment performance ever since the onset of the 
crisis might be read, as reflecting the onset of some new, durable boost to the city’s 
competitive advantage, at just the point when one of its weaknesses had been exposed. 
Or, it might instead be seen as the outcome of two distinct, shorter term developments, 
one effectively damping down the local impact of a major economic bust, and the other 
adding fuel to the firing up of another London-centred boom. In my view it is less 
misleading to recognise rather different stories playing out during the downswing and the 
upswing phases, though with financial support policies playing strong, if currently 
unquantifiable roles in each.  In the first case, massive subsidies to the city’s major 
investment banks (surely) absorbed much of the momentum of the expected downswing, 
while subsequently two underplayed aspects of QE, its diversion into emerging markets 
and its revival of plutonomic consumption (also surely) gave a kick-start to an especially 
strong upswing for this city.   
 
Both episodes should probably be seen as parts of two longer-running sagas. One of 
these, outlined by Haldane (2015) characterises the period covered by this paper in terms 
of an international ‘crisis trilogy’, with the Anglo-Saxon crisis, followed by a Euro-zone 
one, and then an emerging market one, nearing its climax now as the slug of global 
liquidity rotating through each setting heads away from these markets.  London would 
(with New York) have been a major actor/character in early acts of the first and third of 
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these ‘plays’, escaping its come-uppance in the first with one dramatic device (‘too big 
and connected to fail’) that the authors say they have now ruled out, and a second (QE) 
which unexpectedly set up the plot for the third. What happens to it next is no clearer 
than at the close of the Anglo-Saxon play.   
 
The other saga is the more open-ended life story of the speculative and volatile character 
that is the modern London economy. These traits are in many ways productive, reflecting 
the intersecting dynamics of pioneering activities in a diverse and complex 
agglomeration, with strong external connections. There is also a less productive tendency, 
however, to focus more on the shifting valuations of existing assets and profitable ways 
of exploiting these, than on the creation of new ones. Looking back on London’s 
successful weathering of almost a decade since the subprime bubble burst, from the 
viewpoint of its current boom, the speculation that supports it seems to have much more 
to do with the values of overseas assets, the lifestyles these can support, and the 
reliability of the state as an underwriter, than with much obvious enhancement of the 
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NOTES 
                                                                
1 The UK economy was actually supposed to be on such a path between 2001 and 2007, 
with constant near-full employment, but consumption growth supported by an 
increasingly unsustainable level of personal debt.  
2 Though in functional terms the ‘London’ economy involves a much wider metropolitan 
area, the regional statistics used here all relate just to the administrative area of 
‘Greater London’.  
3 In the case of unemployment (as distinct from employment) trends the patterns are 
rather different, since recessions also impact on regional labour supply, via a blunting of 
mobility, thus leading to consistently larger unemployment swings in regions of long 
term employment decline(Gordon,  1985).  
4 Cyclicality, or cyclical sensitivity, as used here, relates to the elasticity of regional 
employment  swings relative to those  in the national total.  
5 If still less so than in construction, and apparently being matched by a (disappearing) 
mining/quarrying sector. 
6 Camden, Hackney, Tower Hamlets and Westminster.  
7 See Appendix Table 1. 
8 See Appendix Figure 1a. 
9 At the aggregate level, for which they are less suited than the LFS, these data show a 
more jagged version of the same basic pattern of change through these years (see 
graphs and tables in the Appendix).   
10 This area, defined on a ward basis, includes the whole of the City plus about half of 
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Camden, Hackney, Islington, Tower Hamlets and Westminster, with a small part of 
Southwark (and Lambeth).  It includes 54 wards in all, stretching from Knightsbridge in 
the west to Dalston in the north, the Elephant and Castle in the south and Mile End in 
the east (with Canary Wharf/Isle of Dogs as an appendage); - see map in Appendix. 
11 The numbers are rough, both because of judgements about where cluster boundaries 
should be drawn (e.g. in relation to sub-sectors with recorded declines) and issues about 
the reliability and consistency of the data series (here depending primarily on the 
employer-based ABI/BRES).  
12 The range cited here relates to the significance of self-employment and agency 
employment in the construction industry; self-employment from the worker-based LFS 
has been added here to ABI/BRES employee figures, but LFS estimates also imply 
substantially larger growth in the sector’s employees, which the ABI/BRES may have 
attributed to the ‘employment agency’ sector.     
13 The focus here is on the downturn phase, since this is the period when  (central) 
London’s favourable performance is most unexpected. Long term trends are 
represented here by 1990 Q1-2008 Q3 rates of change, and the two downturns by 1990 
Q1 – 1993 Q1 and 2008 Q3 –2010 Q3.  
14 Early job losses in manufacturing seem to have been checked by the substantial 
2008/9 depreciation in the exchange rate, after which overall UK manufacturing 
employment actually stabilised, with a break from its long term downward trend. 
15 Two other relevant points are that: the hoarding argument cannot explain actual job 
increases, such as occurred in central London; and that while job losses across the 
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country were surprisingly limited in this recession that was true across a wide range of 
jobs, not just the most skilled, possibly because depressed wage levels made labour-
intensive methods more economic (HMT, 2015, Annex A). 
16 BTA (2001) estimates for the sector are 3 times those for overall exports, whereas 
those for other services tend to be below average (Kamath and Paul, 2011).    
17 Speakers at a Plutonomy Symposium in 2006 noted 3 relevant (social) desires among 
those buying luxury goods - to show off, to explore, and to acquire an expertise to be 
asked about – and that the ultra-rich tend to be very global, not part of a specific 
geography, but ‘hanging out in plutonomy destinations (like London) with fellow 
plutonomists’ (Kapur et al., 2006b).  
18 The main exception being the (social) housing element of Olympics construction.   
19  HM Treasury Public Spending Statistics, releases Oct. 2012 and October 2013. Her 
Majesty’s Treasury (‘the  Treasury’) is the UK’s finance ministry.  
20 On Labour Force Survey estimates which relate to places of work as reported by 
individuals, rather than the office address of an employer or agency.  
21 Including public administration plus educational, health and social services. Some of 
which will actually be privately marketed, or involve private contractors to public 
institutions 
22 It is, of course, possible that some of this growth is not genuine, but a statistical 
illusion, reflecting operational delays in recognising head office establishments.  But 
inspection of the location and timing of various recorded additions does not suggest a 
simple reclassification out of some other activity.   
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23 This base rate, independently set by the UK’s central bank, the Bank of England (‘the 
Bank’), relates to the interest it charges for loans to commercial banks – the discount 
rate in US terms.  
24 According to annual reports to Parliament from the Comptroller and Auditor General 
on Maintaining Financial Stability across the UK’s Banking System.  
25 Koo actually reports that all four international instances of QE (in Japan, the US, UK 
and the Eurozone) showed ‘drastic liquidity injections resulting in minimal increases in 
money supply and credit’, in the context of ‘balance sheet recession’ in the national 
economies , with least sign of positive responses in the UK and Eurozone. 
26 This estimate is based on data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. 
27 For the US, Blinder and Zandi (2015) estimate that overall financial policies served to 
raise GDP levels in the trough of the recession by 6.2%, while at its strongest QE came to 
contribute 1.5%. 
28 Fisher (2010), picked up with more specific examples by a Bloomberg journalist (David 
Lynch: ‘Bernanke's “Cheap Money” stimulus spurs corporate investment outside U.S.’, 
Nov 17, 2010).  
29 Professor Phillip Haynes and Alan W. Kay.  Kay argued that the Bank and Treasury had 
no idea where the benefit of the QE money went (just saying that actual money could 
not leave the sterling area), and referenced an article by Dr. Ros Altman noting this issue 
at the time when QE was first announced.   
30 As an example of the potential importance of such spillovers into small open 
economies, Haldane cites evidence that the UK economy might have been more 
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impacted by the US QE programme than its own.  More speculatively, one might suggest 
that evidence from the same source (Weale and Wieladek, 2015) that the maximum 
impact response of an asset purchase shock on the home economy was about double in 
the US case as  for the UK might reflect a greater leakage potential out of (as well as 
into) smaller, more open economies.  
31 As also on Macau gambling and Malaysian property prices, for this is a global story 
about QE effects spilling beyond their country of origin.  
